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THE POWER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE TO SUBPOENA BOOKS AND RECORDS
IN TAX INVESTIGATIONS
A Bureau of Internal Revenue agent was investigating the tax re-
turns of a union president. The agent subpoenaed all union records
relating to any transactions between the union and its president.
The union failed to comply, and upon complaint being filed, the district
court ordered the subpoena enforced. 2 The court of appeals reversed
and remanded the cause for further proceedings, holding that it was
necessary to show that the records sought were related to the tax
liability of the union officer under investigation3
The court's requirement of proof of a relationship between the
records sought and the union president's tax liability raises the ques-
tion of how broadly the Internal Revenue Bureau can frame a sub-
poena duces tecum. In considering this problem two classes of cases
will be discussed: (1) those which will be referred to as "two party"
cases in which the party whose records are subpoenaed is under inves-
tigation; (2) and "third party" situations, such as the principal case,
in which the party whose records are subpoenaed is not directly under
investigation. 4 The courts have not treated these two situations in
the same manner and unless this distinction is kept in mind, one
may easily fall prey to the mistaken belief that a hopeless maze of
contradictory cases exists.
The fourth and fifth amendments have long been held to be limita-
1. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7602(2). This section gives the Bureau of
Internal Revenue power to subpoena the books and records of one whose tax
liability is under investigation, or "any other person" who may have pertinent
data.
2. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7604(a). This section gives a United States
district court jurisdiction to enforce a subpoena issued pursuant to § 7602(2) of
the Code. In Local 174, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 240 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1956) the complaint was supported by an affidavit
which stated that the union president had received money from the union as
"loans," which were unsecured, and it was argued that these "loans" should be
investigated because his returns showed no interest payments.
3. Local 174, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, supra
note 2.
4. The law is well established that a "third person" who is not under im-
mediate investigation may be subpoenaed under § 7602(2). E.g., In re Albert
Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital, 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953); First Nat'l Bank
v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947).
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tions on the subpoena power of administrative agencies. Because the
fifth amendment is personal in nature it normally can be raised as a
defense only in the "two party" cases; usually only the person under
investigation can refuse to answer on grounds that he may incrimi-
nate himself.6 Thus accountants 7 banks,8 and stockbrokers," who are
"third parties," cannot invoke the amendment on behalf of a tax-
payer under investigation. Also corporations" and unions11 are not
privileged from furnishing self-incriminating evidence, even when
they are directly under investigation, because their structure is public
in nature.12 However, the availability of the fifth amendment as a
defense in the conventional "two party" cases has recently been
5. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). This is the leading case
holding that the fourth and fifth amendments are limitations on the government's
subpoena power. The pertinent sections of these amendments which restrict the
government's subpoena power are the "search and seizure" clause of the fourth
and the "self-incrimination" clause of the fifth. Prior to this case an illegal
search and seizure was confined primarily to situations in which officers "actually"
encroached on one's property or person and by force took the evidence they de-
sired. See Davis, Administrative Law § 32 (1951). But the Court here reasoned
that to force one, by issuance of a subpoena, to produce his private books and
records was equivalent to an "actual" search and seizure. The Court considered
a subpoena in the nature of a "constructive" search and seizure and thus a vio-
lation of the fourth amendment when improperly framed.
But see Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 202 (1946)
where the Court stated, "The primary source of misconception concerning the
Fourth Amendment's function lies perhaps in the identification of cases involving
so-called ... 'constructive' search with cases of actual search and seizure." See
also Davis, op. cit. supra, at § 32 which states, "The Amendment's prohibition
of unreasonable searches and seizures might well have been limited to what the
words cover-searches and seizures." With regard to the production of one's
records the Court in the Boyd case said that the fourth and fifth amendments
"... run almost into each other." 116 U.S. at 630. This indicates that when a
subpoena is issued one may have both amendments available to justify non-
compliance.
6. A third party may invoke the privilege only when he is the one who will
be incriminated. In re Friedman, 104 F. Supp. 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
7. E.g., Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 864 (1953).
8. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947);
United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 295 Fed. 142 (S.D. Ala. 1924).
9. McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1937). Contra, Zimmermann v.
Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936), overruled, 105 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1939).
10. See e.g., Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913); Wheeler v. United
States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913); United States v. Cooper, 288 Fed. 604 (N.D. Iowa
1923).
11. E.g., United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
12. This stems from the personal nature of the fifth amendment. See Mc-
Cormick, Evidence § 125 (1954).
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subjected to severe limitations.13 The courts have reasoned that be-
cause the law requires a taxpayer to keep records for tax purposes,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue can inspect them at any time to deter-
mine tax liability. Nevertheless, since there has been no Supreme
Court decision on this matter, one should continue to raise the privi-
lege against self-incrimination as a defense.
For a subpoena to be valid within the bounds of the illegal search
and seizure clause of the fourth amendment, the courts have required
proof that the information sought be relevant and of reasonable
breadth. 14 In the "two party" cases courts have been hesitant to put
any limitation on the administrative order. The attitude seems to be
that individuals suspected of violations should not be allowed to use
the fourth amendment as a subterfuge to hinder the efficiency of the
Internal Revenue Bureau and, therefore, taxpayers must cooperate
fully by producing all requested records."5 This attitude has led some
13. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), severely impinged upon the
long line of precedent (see note 4 supra) which supported the applicability of
the fifth amendment as a limitation on the subpoena power of administrative
agencies. The Court held that records which the OPA required a fruit and
produce wholesaler to keep could not be withheld under a claim of the privilege
against self-incrimination. It had long been held that public records were not
within this privilege. E.g., State v. Donovan, 10 N.D. 203, 86 N.W. 709 (1901);
People v. Coombs, 158 N.Y. 532, 53 N.E. 527 (1899). But the Shapiro case seems
to make all required records public records. An important question is what effect
the Shapiro case will have on § 6001 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which
gives the Bureau authority to require taxpayers to keep records. The first ap-
pearance of the Shapiro doctrine in a tax case was in Falsone v. United States,
205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953), where the court said
that the taxpayer could not raise the privilege against self-incrimination be-
cause he was required by law to keep records for tax purposes. 205 F.2d at 739.
For other tax cases which have reasoned similarly, see Smith v. United States,
236 F.2d 260 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 909 (1956); Beard v. United
States, 222 F.2d 84 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955); United States
v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365 (M.D. Ga. 1955).
14. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946),
where the Court stated: "[In cases involving] ... production of corporate records
and papers in response to a subpoena ... the Fourth [amendment], if applicable,
at the most guards against abuse only by way of too much indefiniteness or
breadth . . . ." See also Davis, op. cit. supra note 4, at 106 which states: "Except
for limitations concerning breadth and relevancy, the Fourth Amendment does
not now restrict an administrative subpoena for records or an administrative
requirement of reports."
15. See e.g., Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943); West-
side Ford Inc. v. United States, 206 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953), where the court
said that in an ex parte inquiry, the standards of relevancy and materiality are
not as rigid as in a trial; United States v. United Distillers Product Corp., 156
F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1946); In the Matter of Carroll, 149 F. Supp. 634 (S.D.N.Y.
1957) (only when a "third party" is requested to produce books or records need
there be shown a relation between the papers sought and a taxpayer's liability).
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courts to very broad statements concerning the scope of the Internal
Revenue's subpoena power in the "two party" cases.16 Thus, in In re
International Corp.'17 the court reasoned that if pertinent records of
third parties can be subpoenaed in an investigation of the tax lia-
bility of a specific taxpayer, then all of the financial records of the
taxpayer are subject to scrutiny. 8
Although "third parties," as noted earlier, cannot raise the defense
of the privilege against self-incrimination for the party under investi-
gation, they can defend on grounds of an unreasonable search and
seizure.19 The liberal statements of the restrictive effect of the fourth
amendment in many "two party" cases, such as the In re International
Corp. case, might appear to apply to the "third party" cases, but
the courts in most instances have been unwilling to make this ex-
tension.20 They still require proof that the records subpoenaed are
"actually needed."21 A merely exploratory search will be held to vio-
late one's fourth amendment rights.2 2 A trend established by many
courts, however, has been to almost completely disregard the breadth
16. See note 14 supra.
17. 5 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
18. Id. at 611.
19. E.g., Bowles v. Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co., 55 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. Ky. 1944).
Judge Pope in the dissenting opinion of the principal case states that unions
cannot resist an administrative subpoena on grounds of an unreasonable search
and seizure. He relies on the case of United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
But it is very doubtful that the Court in that case so held. The Court there
stated: ". . . that neither the Fourth nor the Fifth Amendment, both of which
are directed primarily to the protection of individual and personal rights, re-
quires the recognition of a privilege against self-incrimination under the cir-
cumstances of this case." 322 U.S. at 698. The Court was speaking of the right
of the union to raise these amendments as a defense to an administrative sub-
poena, but it was peculiarly considering the fourth amendment in reference to the
privilege against self-incrimination and failed to mention the possibility of the
illegal search and seizure clause as a defense. The majority opinion in the
principal case completely ignored United States v. White and based its holding
on illegal search and seizure grounds. 240 F.2d at 390.
20. See e.g., Chapman v. Goodman, 219 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1955), where a
court's order to an attorney to produce the records of his client was held to
require only that the attorney bring the records to court for the judge to deter-
mine which ones the agency could properly subpoena; First Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947), where the court held that in "third party"
cases it must be shown that the records desired bear upon matters under in-
vestigation; Redlich, Searches, Seizures, and Self-Incrimination in Tax Cases,
10 Tax L. Rev. 191, 203 -(1954): "When third parties are directed to produce
records . . . there is a greater likelihood that the 'fishing expedition' defense
will prevail."
21. Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 33 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1940), aff'd,
128 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1942).
22. Mays v. Davis, 7 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Pa. 1934).
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and relevancy limitations formerly imposed under the fourth amend-
ment, even in "third party" cases.23 This trend is based upon the
premise that public necessity is paramount to private civil liberties,
and is especially prominent in recent cases. The reasoning behind it
is that the agency, in order to fulfill the purposes for which it was
organized, must be permitted to engage in "some fishing."2 Although
it is still required that there be reasonable grounds for suspicion,2 5
this trend represents quite an extension of the "actually needed"
test .
2
Certain factors, in addition to whether a "two party" or "third
party" case is involved, appear to have influenced the determination
of how broadly a subpoena may be framed. For example, the dissent
in the principal case suggested that the degree of possible guilt or
innocence of the "third party" should also be considered.27 Thus, in
the principal case, where there was a good chance that the union was
as guilty as its president, the dissent would have treated the union as
if it were under immediate investigation. 28 Although courts have not
expressly considered the possible innocence or guilt of the "third
party," the cases in which limitations of breadth have been imposed
23. One of the first "third party" cases to disregard the fourth amendment's
limitations of breadth and relevancy (see note 13 supra) was Miles v. United
Founders Corp., 5 F. Supp. 413 (D. N.J. 1933). In this case the government was
allowed to order a corporation to produce the names of each shareholder who had
transferred his stock, so that each individual shareholder's income might be
assessed. See also Peoples Deposit Bank and Trust Co. v. United States,
212 F.2d 86 (6th Cir. 1954), where the court was satisfied with testimony of a
special agent that he had a strong suspicion of a false or fraudulent tax return,
and did not require any other proof that the return was false or fraudulent; In
re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital, 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953) (empha-
sized the necessity of public interest over private interest); Stone v. Frandle, 89
F. Supp. 222 (D. Minn. 1950) where the internal revenue agent ordered a stenog-
rapher, whose tax liability was not directly under investigation, to produce notes
taken at an arbitration hearing. The court held that she should produce such
notes whether or not they were related to any books of account of the taxpayer
or others.
24. See United States ex rel. Sathre v. Third Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 102
F. Supp. 879, 881 (D. Minn.), appeal dismissed on stipulation of parties, 196 F.2d
501 (8th Cir. 1952).
25. Ibid.
26. See text supported by note 20 supra.
27. 240 F.2d at 395.
28. Judge Pope in the dissenting opinion said that to treat the union as an
innocent third party, which is subject to greater protection under the fourth
amendment, would be the same as saying that in the investigation of one sus-
pected of stealing, a receiver of the stolen goods would be a "third party" with
rights of privacy. 240 F.2d at 395 n.1.
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on the subpoena power are those where the "third party" was rela-
tively free from suspicion of guilt.29
The nature of what the agent is trying to prove may also influence
a court. In the principal case the Bureau of Internal Revenue sought
to prove that the union president never repaid certain "loans" he had
received from the union. Therefore, it is difficult to see how the
subpoena could have been drafted without including all records in any
way related to transactions between the union and its president. 0 It
would be necessary to examine all such records to see whether or not
the loans in question had been repaid. The information sought in
many of the "third party" cases where the breadth of the administra-
tive subpoena power was limited was not of this negative character,
and thus could have been obtained through a less comprehensive in-
spection of the books.31 Therefore, it is submitted that the decision in
the principal case is significant for its restrictive view of breadth and
relevancy, especially in view of the modern trend in "third party"
cases, the possible guilt of the union, and the nature of the informa-
tion sought.
In the past, courts have been more conscious of private civil liber-
ties. However, as our society becomes more complex, there has been
a growing tendency to increase administrative agencies' subpoena
power. This is well illustrated by the cases which have limited the
availability of the privilege against self-incrimination even when the
party is under immediate investigation. The cases restricting the
limiting effects of the fourth amendment in "third party" situations
are also illustrative. Taxation problems have increased in proportion
to the complexity of society. It is submitted that the Bureau of In-
ternal Revenue must necessarily have access to a great many records
if it is to be an effective agency of the government. It is further
submitted that in the future the courts, in an effort to prevent tax
frauds, will continue to provide the Bureau of Internal Revenue with
a more extensive subpoena power than is granted to other adminis-
trative agencies of the federal government.
29. See notes 19-21 supra.
30. Judge Pope in the dissenting opinion recognized the necessity of permit-
ting the Internal Revenue Bureau to inspect all of the union's records when he
said: "Do my associates suggest that these books must be brought into Judge
Bowen's court and that Judge Bowen should read them all for the purpose of
satisfying himself that they contained no entry showing repayment of these
loans?" 240 F.2d at 398. This statement accurately indicates the impracticabiility
in many instances of having the court determine whether the records sought are
relevant and therefore subject to administrative investigation.
31. See e.g.,.First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947);
Mays v. Davis, 7 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Pa. 1934).
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